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ABSTRACT
Ordoliberalism is widely considered to be the dominant ideology of the German
political elite today and consequently responsible at least in part for its hard
‘austerity’ line during the recent Eurozone crisis. This article presents a
genealogy of the main concerns, concepts and problems around which early
German ordoliberalism was formed and structured as a political and economic
ideology. Early ordoliberalism is shown to be rooted in an interwar
Germanophone Lutheran Evangelical tradition of anti-humanist ‘political
ethics’. Its speciﬁc conceptions of the market, the state, the individual,
freedom and duty were developed on a Lutheran Evangelical basis.
Analytically, the article considers ideological inﬂuences of theology on
political and economic theory not so much in terms of consensus and
ideational overlap, but rather in terms of shared concerns, concepts and
problems across diﬀerent positions.
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1. Introduction: unity and variety in neoliberalism
In Colombel’s (1994, p. 128) accurate rephrasing of Foucault’s (1993,
p. 35) ‘history of the present’, genealogy is ‘the history of a problem of
which the present relevance must be assessed’. One such problem, one
that is of major political, cultural and sociological interest in Europe
today, relates to the particular German tradition of economic and political
thinking termed ordoliberalism. Since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and par-
ticularly with the ensuing Eurozone crisis, scholars in political economy
and related disciplines have discussed intensively whether Germany’s
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hard-line ‘austerity’ policy towards ‘periphery’ countries – Greece in par-
ticular – reﬂects the ordoliberal ideology in which the German political
elite was born and raised. In the eyes of some, ordoliberalism’s emphasis
on debtor responsibility (no bail-out), budgetary surplus as the objective
of ﬁscal policy, low-inﬂation targeting as the sole goal of monetary
policy, and advocacy for de-politicised technocratic (rule-based) econ-
omic policy in general, have been omnipresent (Blyth, 2013; Hillebrand,
2015; Matthijs & McNamara, 2015; Nedergaard & Snaith, 2015; Young,
2014). Others strongly oppose this view, arguing that if old ordoliberalism
was ever relevant to understanding German politics at all, it has no
inﬂuence today over real political interests in explaining the German pos-
ition (see Berghahn, 2015; Feld, Köhler, & Nientiedt, 2015; Wigger, 2017).
Taking a step back from this unresolved debate, it is worthwhile asking
ourselves if we have really understood what ordoliberalism is. To be sure,
publications that describe and discuss the economic and political tenets of
ordoliberalism are now abundant (in addition to the above, see Bonefeld,
2012; Felice & Vatiero, 2014; Siems & Schnyder, 2014; Vatiero, 2015). But
digging deeper, following Colombel, we may ask: what were the problems
that originally concerned and shaped ordoliberalism as a political and
economic current of thought and what is the present relevance of those
problems? This is no small endeavour. Indeed, the present article will
deliver only on the ﬁrst part of the question: identifying the original con-
cerns and problems. The second step – assessing their contemporary rel-
evance for understanding the politics of the Eurozone crisis – will be no
less demanding and will require separate treatment elsewhere. There are
hints provided in the existing literature, as we shall see, but its completion
would presuppose a solid answer to the ﬁrst part of the question, which is
what this article sets out to provide.
The article’s main contribution is intended to be establishing that when
ordoliberalism emerged in interwar Germany, it was not solely a response
to the political and economic turmoil of the time (hyperinﬂation, mass
unemployment, the chaos of parliamentary democracy and the fall of
the Weimar Republic), as is often stated. At its very core, early ordoliber-
alism was also shaped by speciﬁc Lutheran Evangelical concerns, concepts
and problems of ‘political ethics’ that signiﬁcantly occupied the Protestant
German intelligentsia at the time. To appreciate this argument, familiarity
is needed with ordoliberalism’s overall topology. Most sociologists are
acquainted with ordoliberalism only via Foucault’s (2004) lectures on
the birth of ‘biopolitics’ – a direct translation, by the way, of the ordolib-
eral notion of Vitalpolitik.
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Ordoliberalism is a diﬃcult ideology to position within the ‘neoliberal
thought collective’ (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). In contrast to Chicago-
style laissez-faire neoliberalism, ordoliberalism emerged from European
attempts at conceiving a ‘new liberalism’ with a strong state, to tame pred-
atory capitalism in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century (Cerny, 2016;
Schulz-Forberg, 2013). Ordoliberalism, says Blyth (2013, p. 57), was
always far from the mantra of ‘markets good, state bad’, but professed
the idea that the state provides the framework conditions ‘within which
markets can operate’ (see also Siems & Schnyder, 2014). In ordoliberalism,
the role of the ‘strong state’ is rather as a bulwark against the abuse of
market and state power by powerful individuals, companies, or social
groups that characterises predatory capitalism (Bonefeld, 2012; Davies,
2014; Mudge, 2008). In order to function as a bulwark against power inter-
ests, the ordoliberal state apparatus must be ‘neutral’ – it must not be the
arena of chaotic parliamentarian conﬂict and the shifting instrument of
whoever happens to be in power. Yet, the ordoliberals were generally
not in favour of dictatorial authority, but rather technocratic authority.
Contrary to Carl Schmitt, the ordoliberals wanted the state apparatus in
its function as custodian of the ‘competition order’ to be de-politicised.
From this perspective, the ordoliberals deﬁned their ‘third way’ or ‘new
liberalism’ not only in opposition to collectivism (Communism, Social
Democracy, Keynesianism), but also to classical ‘Manchester’ laissez-
faire liberalism. In fact, they deﬁned themselves as anti-capitalists. To
them, what they called a true ‘competition order’ required a strong state
to hinder the formation of power groups (monopolies, cartels, labour
unions) in the market and to set up the constitutional legal framework
for competition to be fair for everyone (Bonefeld, 2012; Felice &
Vatiero, 2014; Gerber, 2001; Siems & Schnyder, 2014; Vatiero, 2015).
Moreover, they saw the cultural development of free entrepreneurial indi-
viduals as a complementary necessity to the legal constitution of the
market. This was the aim of what they called Vitalpolitik or ‘vitality poli-
tics’ as an alternative to collectivist welfare-state programmes (Bonefeld,
2017; Siems & Schnyder, 2014).
Genealogy contributes to the above doctrinal understanding of early
ordoliberalism by unearthing the Lutheran Evangelical inheritance under-
lying its central political and economic tenets. In fact, I argue, in early
ordoliberalism the ‘strong state’ was not promoted for its own sake, but
because it could act as the only legitimate ‘worldly authority’ in the
Lutheran sense: de-personalised, de-humanised and consequently de-poli-
ticised and technocratic. Lutheran Evangelicalism is radically diﬀerent
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from the popular vision of Christianity as a humanist religion. In Lutheran
Evangelicalism, no human sense of justice is legitimate since God alone
knows justice. Consequently, while the state inevitably needs to be run
by sinful human beings, it must not be subjugated to their personal
sense of right and wrong; the only solution is to be rule-based and techno-
cratic. In the ‘political ethics’ of German interwar Lutheran Evangelical-
ism, Christian love for one’s neighbour is not the love of one person for
the other, but love expressed as ‘duty’ to worldly authority – as techno-
cratic service to the anonymous ‘order’ of the state, even when this
service requires the use of violence. Adopting this notion of anonymous
order, I argue, the early ordoliberalism expanded it to extend also to ‘com-
petition order’. In other words, like that of the ‘strong state’, the ordolib-
eral promotion of free markets was not fundamentally due to it being ‘just’
or even ‘eﬃcient’ in human terms (as in utilitarian Anglo-Saxon laissez-
faire neoliberalism), but precisely because well-regulated competition
(safeguarded against the accumulation of power) serves as an anonymous,
a-human ordering mechanism for society.
The analysis here is conducted at the level of discourse (Foucault, 2008)
by showing the continuities of concerns, concepts and problems running
from a speciﬁc passage in Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, via Luther
and the ‘political ethics’ of early twentieth Century German Lutheran
Evangelicalism, to the ﬁrst formulations of ordoliberalism between the
early 1930s and the mid-1950s. At each step in this history there were
bifurcations, and thus the same passages in the Bible and in Luther
have also motivated other, including humanist, forms of Protestantism
and liberalism – to some of which ‘political ethics’ and early ordoliberal-
ism were vehemently opposed. In other words, the history of discursive
continuities is not teleological, but rather retro-active at every step, as
old utterances are mobilised into new contexts. In focusing the analysis
on such discursive continuities, I take certain biographical elements as
pre-givens already established by existing literature – in particular the
devoted Protestant faith of all the protagonists of early ordoliberalism
(Manow, 2001; see also Hien, 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, Manow (2001,
2010) characterises early ordoliberalism as ‘economic order theology’
and diagnoses Germany’s so-called ‘social market economy’ as a post-
war compromise between Protestant and Catholic economic and political
thought. Hien (2017b, p. 5) explains that the Protestant roots of ordoliber-
alism set it apart from Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism due to its conception of
human beings as ‘saints and sinners at the same time’, which is ‘why they
need to be under an institutional order that disciplines the sinner’.
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The ‘strong state’, in turn, would have to be designed so as to de-politicise
the economy and society in general (Manow, 2010, p. 2).
But the existing literature is open for elaboration on more precisely how
Protestantism shaped the early ordoliberal conceptions of freedom and
the state. It has searched for points of doctrinal identity between ordoli-
beralism and Protestant theology and tends to end where disagreement
between them surfaces. For example, Manow concludes his analysis at
the point where his ordoliberal protagonists start criticising the ‘political
ethics’ of the order theologians in demanding unconditional obedience
to worldly authorities, even national socialist ones (Manow, 2001,
p. 189). Hien (2017a, p. 266) suggests that early ordoliberalism ‘might
bear the imprint of both mainline Lutheranism and ascetic Protestantism’
although, following Weber (1965), Calvinism is traditionally associated
with the development of Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire neoliberalism. But
Hien remains at the level of hypothesis and he, too, restricts himself to
the search for points of theoretical consensus between theological and
economic doctrines, stating that this ‘could’ be the case and that it
‘would’ then explain ‘the schizophrenia of ordoliberalism when consider-
ing the strong institutions’ (Hien, 2017a, p. 266). Indeed, as will become
clear, interwar Germanophone Lutheran Evangelicalism – as well as the
early ordoliberals – were not dismissive of Calvin. But what occupied
them was a speciﬁc set of concepts, concerns and problems across the
writings of Luther and Calvin that were diﬀerent from the concepts, con-
cerns and problems in Luther and Calvin that occupied the reformed Pro-
testant sects analysed by Weber (1965) or the liberal Lutheran theology of
Troeltsch and others (see Adair-Toteﬀ, 2017).
On this basis, the present article makes the double contribution of (a)
substantiating our understanding of the Protestant roots of early ordoli-
beralism and (b) changing the focus from points of doctrinal identity to
the continuity of concerns, concepts and problems across Lutheran Evan-
gelicalism and early ordoliberalism. While the article is limited to the
history of the problems that deﬁned early ordoliberalism, as a way of
setting the overall perspective of the contribution made, it is worthwhile
brieﬂy alluding to possible directions for future research in taking up
the challenge of assessing their present relevance. Blyth (2013, p. 57) rep-
resents the widespread view that ordoliberalism became ‘the governing
philosophy of German economic elites’ after WWII, but specialists in
the ﬁeld emphasise the compromises made with other ideologies,
notably Catholic social thought (Manow, 2010). However, the Protestant
underpinning of ordoliberalism still appear today. For example, based on
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the speeches of German ﬁnance minister Wolfgang Schäuble and Central
Bank President Jens Weidmann between 2010 and 2015, Hien (2017b) has
recently pointed to the central role of their Lutheran faith in their ideologi-
cal and political positions during the Eurozone crisis. Contrary to many
political economists, Hien and Joerges (2018) argue that the economic
tenets of ordoliberalism cannot be decoupled from its core principles of
law and culture that have been marginalised in the EU project and
during the Eurocrisis by Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire neoliberalism, but
also point to its enduring importance to the German political elite. This
suggests that the debate over ordoliberalism’s possible inﬂuence on
policy and politics, historically as well as today, can probably not be
settled without a deep understanding of its formation and structure as
an ideology (see also Hien, 2017a). In this way, the present article aims
to contribute to the sociological study of the interplay between cultural
and political dimensions of contemporary European societies. It also
helps to distinguish ordoliberalism, with its Lutheran Evangelical roots,
from the secularised ‘Protestant ethic’ of utilitarianism analysed by
Weber and, by extension, from the tradition of laissez faire liberalism.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the genealogical
approach and its relevance for the present contribution. Section 3 analyses
the theological genealogy of early ordoliberalism in its characteristic con-
cepts, concerns and problems. Section 4 discusses early ordoliberalism in
comparison with Weber’s ‘Protestant ethics’ and argues for a distinction
between the two discourses based not on Calvin and Luther, but on
diﬀerent concerns, concepts and problems. Section 5 concludes and
points out directions for future research.
2. Towards a genealogy of early ordoliberalism
The early ordoliberals knew the Lutheran Evangelical ‘political ethics’ of
their contemporary theologian colleagues well. But it would be mistaken
to hinge the validity of the entire genealogy on questions of whether the
early ordoliberals agreed or not with certain precise doctrines in political
ethics, or on whether they got their central concerns, concepts and pro-
blems directly from reading these speciﬁc authors or via other sources.
These are almost by deﬁnition irresolvable biographical questions that –
if overemphasised – involve the risk of blurring the discursive continuity
of problems, concerns and concepts in the search for doctrinal uniformity
and direct interpersonal transmissions of ideas. On the one hand, the early
ordoliberals did in fact read and seemed to appreciate the authors of
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‘political ethics’. Röpke (1944, p. 28) cites Brunner (1943) with reverence.
Müller-Armack (1968b, p. 562) mentions Barth and Brunner in his ‘social
irenic’. Eucken approves of Brunner’s (1943) work on justice as manifest-
ing a ‘very extensive agreement with competition order’ and only criticises
his lay understanding of economic mechanisms (Eucken, 1943, pp. 348–
349). On the other hand, the ordoliberal Bonhoeﬀer Memorandum,
which will be discussed in detail in section 3, cites Althaus, Brunner
and Gogarten with much scepticism, arguing that their conception of
divine orders comes dangerously close to Catholicism (Freiburger Kreis,
1979, p. 57). In a letter to Röpke, Rüstow even rejects Luther and
Calvin and claims that Eucken is on his side in so doing: ‘Religion as
faith, yes; religion as magic, no’ (Rüstow, 1946, p. 178). What to do
with this contradictory ‘evidence’ on the possible direct inﬂuences of pol-
itical ethics on early ordoliberalism and their possible doctrinal identities?
For the purposes of genealogy, I argue, the question is ill-posed.
The interesting question for genealogy is not whether the ordoliberals
said they liked political ethics or not, nor whether their ideas were iden-
tical or not, nor the precise lines of inﬂuence that link the two, but
whether or not there is continuity of problems, concerns and concepts
between them. The early ordoliberals, I argue, were occupied with
Lutheran problems, but of course they did more than restating Luther’s
views: they provided new responses to those problems and concerns
and added new concepts for a new historical situation. The focus in gen-
ealogy is on whether or not the core motivating intellectual concerns, con-
cepts and problems are carried across these diﬀerent literatures. Indeed, as
we shall see, while the Bonhoeﬀer Memorandum expresses criticism of
political ethics, its core concepts, concerns and problems are identical to
those of political ethics. Even when Rüstow, as mentioned above, see-
mingly rejects Luther, he does so with a distinctly Lutheran Evangelical
argument, as will be clear from section 3. Similarly, the decisive question
for us to speak about ordoliberalism and oppose it to laissez faire liberal-
ism is not whether the early ordoliberals agreed narrowly on a number of
political tenets or not. For example, some ordoliberals (Müller-Armack in
particular) were attracted to Nazism, and so were some of the theological
proponents of political ethics (Gogarten in particular), while others
remained ﬁrm opponents (Rüstow and Röpke) or more tacit critics
(Eucken) of the Nazi regime and ideology. Again, the decisive question
for the genealogical analysis is rather whether the motivating concerns
and problems for these diﬀerent political and theoretical position-
takings were the same.
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Likewise, the fact that the early ordoliberals agreed with Austrian and
Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire neoliberals and economists on many points
about market economy does not mean that the diﬀerence between them
is simply a matter of ‘degree’. As is clear, for instance, from the session
on ‘Liberalism and Christianity’ at the ﬁrst Mont Pelerin Society
meeting in 1947 (at which Eucken participated along with Knight,
Hayek, Popper and other renowned neoliberals), their underlying intellec-
tual and religious motives diverged radically from one another. Genealogy
concerns the core intellectual concepts, concerns and problems, not
simply formal adherence to an intellectual or political doctrine. Indeed,
if one looked solely at Luther’s (1966a [1524]) speciﬁc economic doctrines
on, for example, interest-rate policy, then there would be hardly any
Lutheranism left in Europe in the twentieth Century. But parts of
Luther did live on, as we shall see, not only in political ethics but also
in early ordoliberalism’s intellectual ediﬁce, while other parts of Luther
survived in other traditions that political ethics and ordoliberalism vehe-
mently opposed. Thus, it is not simply a question of Luther or not Luther,
but of a certain discursive continuity from speciﬁc aspects of Luther’s writ-
ings to early ordoliberalism, alongside other discursive continuities
(undoubtedly of equal importance, but the topic of other research). In
this way, focusing on concerns, concepts and problems rather than
points of consensus or doctrinal overlap has the analytical advantage of
specifying the diversity and even disagreements and contradictions
within an ideology (organised around the same problem), while maintain-
ing a relatively sharp distinction between ideologies (organised around
diﬀerent problems), even when their respective protagonists may agree
or compromise on certain political or theoretical points.
3. Lutheran Evangelical roots of early ordoliberalism
An illuminating point of entry to the collective endeavour of the early
ordoliberal thinkers to develop a distinct Lutheran Evangelical approach
to economic and political theory is found in the so-called Bonhoeﬀer
Denkschrift of the ‘Freiburger Circle’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979). This 1943
underground memorandum was named after the pastor and co-founder
of the Confessing Church, the anti-Nazi branch of Evangelicalism in
Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeﬀer, who was executed for his opposition to
the regime and his attempts to corporate with Allied forces in 1945.
The Memorandum sketches a religious, social and economic order for
post-Nazi Germany (Freiburger Kreis, 1979). It counts key ﬁgures of
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early ordoliberalism among its authors: the economists Walter Eucken
and Adolf Lampe, the jurist Franz Böhm, and the polyhistor Constantin
von Dietze. (What later became known as the ‘Freiburger School’ of econ-
omics is in fact synonymous with a number of key ﬁgures of early ordo-
liberalism, such as Eucken, Böhm, Miksch and Großmann-Doerth.)
What brought the ‘Freiburger circle’ together in 1938 following the
Kristallnacht on 9 November, in which a violent pogrom against Jews
was instigated throughout Germany, was the need felt by the authors to
reﬂect upon the ‘assignments (Aufgaben) of Christians and the Church
in our time’ (Manow, 2001, pp. 85–86; Thielicke, 1979, p. 7). TheMemor-
andum already invokes ‘Christian conscience’ in its subtitle and opens not
with what must be done politically, but with a theological discussion of
Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and its interpretation by Luther and
contemporary German theologians. In other words, a fundamental theo-
logical problem was identiﬁed, whose solution was considered by the early
ordoliberals to be a pre-requisite for engaging in political and economic
questions. In particular, the authors are concerned with the injunction
to obey ‘worldly authorities’ (Rom. 13,2). In other words, the problem
that must be solved before the authors can even begin the discussion of
politics is the very legitimacy of the Memorandum as an act of revolt
against Nazi rule and hence an apparent violation of the Pauline
injunction.
The authors unsurprisingly conclude that their project is legitimate, but
add that more theological groundwork remains to be done before politics
can enter the picture. In a long historical analysis following the initial dis-
cussion of Romans, theMemorandummakes an extensive argument about
the crisis of capitalism and the Nazi rise to power as the end-result of a
long process of ‘secularisation’, initiated with the Enlightenment and
through which Western societies have abandoned God and deiﬁed man
(Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 41–54). Finally, the Memorandum turns to
a discussion of a central problem in Lutheran Evangelical theology: Are
human beings capable of producing any political and social improvements
whatsoever, given that man is sinful and without justice? Again, the
authors conclude that there is a marginal space of possibility for them
to formulate their vision of Germany’s political future. The literature on
early ordoliberalism has almost exclusively focused on its visions for econ-
omic, legal and political order, but in the Memorandum these topics are
relegated to the appendices, clearly indicating the hierarchy of problems
and the order in which they thought these problems could be adequately
dealt with. While there are several other instances of Lutheran discourse in
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the writings of the early ordoliberals, as we shall see, this is what makes the
Memorandum a particularly appropriate starting-point for the present
analysis.
3.1. Faith, love and worldly authority from Saint Paul to Luther
Lutheran Evangelical theology breaks radically with widespread common-
places about Christianity as a humanist religion, as it rejects notions of
‘good deeds’ or a ‘just’ human society, claiming instead that ‘loving
one’s neighbour’ can involve punishing and even killing. Lutheran Evan-
gelicalism thus distinguishes itself clearly both from the mainly Anglo-
Saxon Calvinist sects analysed by Weber (1965) and from the 19th-
century German tradition of liberal humanist and historicist
Protestantism.
Two points in Romans are critical to Lutheran Evangelicalism. First, the
essence and fulﬁlment of the law has nothing to do with acting in accord-
ance with the Biblical commandments, for ‘a person is justiﬁed by faith
apart from works prescribed by the law’ (Rom. 3,28). Second, worldly
authorities must be obeyed, since ‘whoever resists authority resists what
God has appointed’ (Rom. 13,2). In Luther’s (Luther, 1966b [1523])
reading, what ties the two points together is the doctrine of ‘two King-
doms’. These are a worldly one of the ‘ﬂesh’ (all that is human and
worldly: Desire and egoism) and a heavenly one of the ‘heart’ (all that is
spiritual: Faith and love). This leads to Luther’s peculiar conception of
obedience and freedom. Worldly authorities are appointed by God to
maintain social order, punish evildoers and make it possible for believers
to be good Christians. Therefore, Christians must obey worldly auth-
orities. But their worldly servitude has no impact on their spiritual
freedom since ‘it is impossible to command anyone to believe in this or
that, or to force him with violence [gewallt]’ (Luther, 1966b [1523], 264,
1984 [1520], 10). Similarly, Calvin – also in a discussion of Romans –
stresses that ‘spiritual freedom can very well coexist with civil servitude’
(Calvin, 1911 [1541], 754).
Freedom in faith is what allows the Christian to make him- or herself a
slave to their neighbour in the name of love and to worldly authority in the
name of obedience. As Saint Paul says to the Galatians: ‘You were called to
freedom, brothers and sisters; only do not use your freedom as an oppor-
tunity for self-indulgence, but through love become slaves to one another’
(Gal. 5, 13). The ‘freedom of a Christian’ has nothing to do with ‘the ﬂesh’
– nor, by extension, with political, economic, material or even physical
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freedom. Even if granted such rights, the Christian remains a slave in
worldly aﬀairs because his or her faith dictates him to unconditionally
serve the neighbour (Luther, 1984 [1520]). This is why Luther can para-
doxically claim that ‘of all human beings the Christian is both the most
free lord, subjected to none, and the most dutiful slave, subjected to every-
one’ (Luther, 1984, p. 8, see also 1960 [1515/1516], 340).
This relates directly to Luther’s view that humans do not know justice
and therefore cannot ingratiate themselves before God through any
outward act whatsoever. They can only do so through faith in God, accept-
ing their own ignorance and fallibility. The ensuing self-eﬀacing obedience
is Luther’s very deﬁnition of love, understood as the rebuﬃng of the ﬂesh
in servitude of one’s neighbour (see Rom. 13,8). In other words, love is
neither an emotional bond nor a speciﬁc kind of action towards other
individuals, but a relationship of pure faith to God, and only through
that to the world. Accordingly, when Jesus says that we should ‘not
resist an evildoer’ (Matt. 5,39), on this reading it does not refer to any
human standard of justice, such as paciﬁsm, but to the abolition of all
human conceptions of justice as instances of the ﬂesh (Luther, 1966b
[1525], 1984 [1520]). ‘[D]o not claim to be wiser than you are. Do not
repay anyone evil for evil… Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave
room for the wrath of God’ (Rom. 12, 16–21).
To Luther, this is how ‘loving one’s neighbour’ and ‘obeying worldly
authorities’ ﬁt together. Since worldly authorities are appointed by God
to punish evildoers, all our outward acts in its service are just by deﬁnition
– that is, as long as they are not motivated by personal desires but by obe-
dience and faith. In other words, ‘love’ may imply punishing and even
killing one’s neighbour in the name of the worldly authority (Luther,
1966b, pp. 265–266). This is why Luther would incite authorities to
‘hurl at, strangle and stab, secretly or in public,’ the ‘predatory and mur-
derous rats’ of the peasantry who had revolted for political and economic
rights (despite Luther’s sympathy for their cause), for ‘nothing can be
more poisonous, pernicious, devilish than a mutinous man’ (Luther,
1964 [1525], 358). The knight waging his sword against the rebels
should not fear violating the Biblical commandments – not even ‘You
shall not murder’ (Ex. 20,13) – for ‘he is God’s oﬃcial and the servant
of his wrath’ (Luther, 1964, p. 360).
The essence of both Good and Evil in Luther is spiritual rather than
actual, and the Biblical commandments conceived in terms of ‘faith
alone’ concern not so much the person who actually murders, but ﬁrst
of all the person who is ‘angry with a brother or sister’ (Matt. 5, 21).
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As Calvin (1911, pp. 118–119) explains based on Paul, the evangelium
(‘good news’, that is, the Gospel) of Jesus is not a correction of the Law
of Moses, but places it in the heart.
3.2. Political ethics and the concept of order
In the early twentieth century, Protestantism in Germany was little con-
cerned with the anti-humanist side of Luther. The dominant tradition
of ‘liberal’ Protestantism with its roots in Schleiermacher’s (2012
[1799]) Kantian idealism was based on humanism, historicism and a
belief in social progress and justice (Barth, 2010, pp. xii–xxvi; Carroll,
2009; Gogarten, 1932, p. 1). But then a young theologian, Karl Barth
(2010 [1919/1922]), published a landmark work on Romans that revita-
lised and radicalised Luther’s reading with the severity of a twentieth-
century continental philosopher. Barth would become one of the
most inﬂuential Protestant theologians of the twentieth century as
well as an opponent of the ‘German Christians’, who were the
proxies in theology of the Nazi regime. To him, faith was not an
emotional or conscious state of mind (Bultmann, 1993, p. 22). His ‘dia-
lectical’ theology has little to do with Hegel’s dynamic syntheses. To
Barth, there are not just two Kingdoms, but a radical divide between
humankind and God. Not only can no human conception of justice
measure up to that of God – divine justice is beyond human measur-
ability, incomprehensible not only to human intellect but also sentiment
(Barth, 2010, p. 39). Only ‘as the unknown God is God known’ (Barth,
2010, p. 57). Therefore, humans must refrain from ‘all positive and
negative evaluations [Bewertungen] and judgements’ (Barth, 2010,
p. 451). The only ethics that can be derived from the Gospel is ‘critique
of all ethos’ (Barth, 2010, p. 451).
In other words, the Pauline injunction to obey worldly authorities is ‘as
an ethical concept purely negative’ – an injunction of ‘non-rebellion’
(Barth, 2010, p. 507). Being human, worldly authority is not just, but
since rebellion against it will always invoke some human conception of
justice, rebellion as such is ‘awelessness and insubordination’ (Barth,
2010, p. 39). The only Good is the negation of everything human: ‘the
abolition of the subject,… the non-acting in every act’ (Barth, 2010,
p. 513). ‘Love’ is the name of that negation as the negation of the ‘ﬂesh’
because all it means is ‘to not resist’ (Barth, 2010, p. 518). Thus deﬁned
as a pure negation, love is not an act: ‘“to subject oneself” is no act’
(Barth, 2010, p. 517).
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Barth thought he had eﬀectively ruled out any conception of ethics
beyond this pure negation, excluding any opposition to worldly order
on that basis. But ten years later, with the Great Depression, widespread
opposition to parliamentary democracy and a generalised sense of civili-
zational crisis among the German intelligentsia, followers such as Emil
Brunner and Friedrich Gogarten began to explore the space for ‘political
ethics’ within the conﬁnes of Lutheran Evangelical theology. While
Barth (1934, 2010, pp. xxvi–xxxi) vehemently opposed their endeavour,
they saw Luther’s concept of ‘order’ as the solid ground for an anti-huma-
nist Christian political ethics based on love and obedience (Gogarten,
1932, pp. 1–4, 32–33). To Brunner and Gogarten, the concept of orders
solves the paradox in Saint Paul between authorities as simultaneously
human and divine. Brunner and Gogarten were not only early members
of the Barth-centred magazine ‘Between the Times’ (Zwischen den
Zeiten), but are also particularly interesting to focus on here because
they went further than their close and likewise inﬂuential peers Bultmann
and Thurneysen in taking the discussion of ethics away from the existen-
tial level of Kierkegaard and Heidegger to the political level. Also, they are
mentioned in a few places by early ordoliberals, albeit only in brief.
Brunner (1978 [1932], 46) explains that the ‘ethical demand’ of Chris-
tianity is ‘no abstract law, no pre-determinable, codiﬁable “program”, but
the letting-one-be-determined through the You [the neighbour] in the
concrete situation’. Again, the essence of Christian ethics is not action,
but obedience in freedom, faith and love as the absence of human
desire and egoism (Brunner, 1978, pp. 69–70; see also Gogarten, 1932,
p. 53). Freedom can therefore coexist with state authority and even coer-
cion, but Brunner also recognises that there is an inbuilt ethics of inequal-
ity here. We must love the concrete neighbour that God has sent our way
as our ‘assignment’ (Aufgabe, the notion also found in theMemorandum)
and therefore accept the social position we have been given in the ‘divine
“orders”’ (Brunner, 1978 [1932], p. 80). ‘[T]he equal worth [of all humans]
before God in no way means equality in historical life’ (Brunner, 1978,
p. 197). Humanist and individualist notions of fundamental equality are
anti-Christian, for humans are created as ‘old and young, child and
father, leader [Führer] and those who are led’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 196).
This is the foundation for Brunner’s and Gogarten’s ‘political ethics’.
Since human beings are radically sinful, they are capable of creating
nothing but a ‘Chaos’ of violently opposing egoist forces (Gogarten,
1932, p. 195). But God has given humans the various orders as social
structures that can curb the eﬀects of Evil. The content of these structures
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is not pre-given. Rather, it is the ‘assignment’ of historical human beings
to ﬁll them in. The orders are hence of a double nature: divine and sinful
(Brunner, 1978 [1932], p. 434). But worldly authority is not the only order
–marriage, the church and other orders are equally important. In fact, it is
not the speciﬁc authority, but rather the divine order of authority as such
that humans must serve. The former must be served only as a consequence
of the latter. This distinction intentionally leaves a slim opening for legit-
imate revolt and for a return of ethos in Lutheran Evangelicalism that was
not present for Barth. Because of the double nature of the orders as both
divine and human, it is not enough to ‘submit oneself and accept’ the
orders (as Barth argued), one must also ‘resist and protest’ because ‘true
faith’ implies ‘the will to improve them to the extent possible’ as a necess-
ary part of ‘obedience to God’s commandment’ (Brunner, 1978, pp. 201–
202). The question, then, is how to do so.
Simply loving the speciﬁc individual next to me would not lift humanity
out of Chaos because it would not rise above the level of human sin. But
the divine orders cut through Chaos, and therefore serving them will do so
too. In other words, loving one’s neighbour must follow servitude to God’s
orders, not the other way around. According to Brunner, ‘the ﬁrst service
to love that is required fromman is to assist in the orders’, ‘be it ever so imper-
fect, crude and “loveless”’, ever so ‘factual-technical’, since the present order
‘is right now the only dam against Chaos’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 207).
Not only does serving the orders sometimes ‘necessitate the use of force,
perhaps of physical violence and even killing’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 209; see
also Althaus, 1923, p. 25). We also encounter a new distinction between
egoism and the ‘factual-technical’ service to the orders. The ‘true auth-
ority’ is neutral and objective because rooted in the divine orders and
hence untainted by the struggles between the opposing egoistic desires
of human individuals or groups (Brunner, 1978, p. 434). Authority –
‘wherever one is put above another… not as an individual, but as the
bearer of an oﬃce’ – is therefore decisive in ‘setting up barriers to the
hatred and hostility of men’, an assignment taken on by the state in
modern Western societies (Gogarten, 1932, pp. 108–109). In the words
of Althaus (1923, pp. 18–19), even ‘the irrational freedom of love’ presup-
poses a legal order and can only occur in an ‘ordered society’.
3.3. Ordoliberalism as Lutheran Evangelical political ethics
We can now better understand why the 1943 Bonhoeﬀer Memorandum
needed to debate the Pauline injunctions and analyse 150 years of
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‘secularisation’ (the historical process of man’s ‘self-deiﬁcation’) before
providing any speciﬁc details of their post-war political vision. Without
a solid assertion that ‘Christian consciousness’ had gone out the
window with Nazism, Communism and laissez faire capitalism, any cri-
tique of these regimes would simply have been pitting one human sense
of justice against another; that is, it would be aweless revolt and resisting
the evildoer. ‘There is no perfect justice on earth’ and any belief in the
capacity of humans to produce one – even that of Christians – is ‘super-
stition which ignores the sinful depravity of any human work’ (Freiburger
Kreis, 1979, p. 55). Only because authority, too, has been corrupted by
human egoism and idolatry is resistance legitimate in order to restore
the divine orders. Their aﬃliation with the political activist Dietrich Bon-
hoeﬀer shows how the early ordoliberals had come to distance themselves
from Barth’s original position, but close reading of the text also shows how
they were still deeply concerned with the same fundamental theological
problems he – and Brunner and Gogarten – dealt with.
To the authors of the Memorandum, the solution is not so simple as
introducing some form of Christian state. The Gospel does not provide
a set of rules that, if implemented, would make worldly society just. On
this reading there is no ‘natural law’, as the Catholics hold – but there
is ‘a Christian attitude towards the “world”, which it orders on the basis
of faith’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 102). The central problem for political
ethics, therefore, according to theMemorandum, resides in the radical div-
ision between humankind and God, which is at once epistemological and
ontological. Epistemological because ‘God alone is truly just, but he is a
hidden (verborgener) God – his justice is not our justice (Rom. 9,20)’ (Frei-
burger Kreis, 1979, p. 55). (This echo of Barth’s ‘unknown God’ is clear.)
Ontological because, contrary to worldly authority, ‘The Kingdom of God
is a Kingdom of Love, not an order based on a legal order, not politics and
not authoritative power (Gewalt)’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 55). Yet,
echoing Brunner’s ‘true authority’, state authority must be ‘real authority’
based on trust, faith and loyalty, according to theMemorandum (Freibur-
ger Kreis, 1979, p. 76).
Just as for Brunner and Gogarten, the combination of orders and the
‘Christian attitude’ of faith, love and obedience solves the problem of pol-
itical ethics, according to the Memorandum. While no positive human
order can be just, not even if based on the commandments of the
Gospel, obeying – but also supporting and developing – the given
human orders out of faith is a legitimate ethical demand because it
curbs human evil (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 102–103).
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In Brunner, the central problem is that orders are simultaneously ‘refer-
ences to God’s will to community’ and ‘tools of an evil violent collective
egoism, the instruments of tyranny’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 201). More speciﬁ-
cally, ‘the scream from millions “Give us work!” is a novelty in world
history’ – both understandable and deplorable, but also threatening to
invade the state with class interests and hence with human egoism,
desires and idolatrous sense of justice (Brunner, 1978, p. 379). Likewise,
in theMemorandum, state authority ‘serves the Good’ as a ‘moral ordering
power’ although it is based on ‘the sword’, that is, on violent force (Frei-
burger Kreis, 1979, pp. 55–56). ‘But the possession of power also contains
a temptation to abuse, to arbitrariness’ that threatens to ‘destroy the moral
conditions and mutual conﬁdence’ and to ‘produce hostility and hatred
instead of love’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 65). Accordingly, ‘there is no
demon that so pressingly needs to be tamed and chained as the demon
of power’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 65).
The demon of power cannot be controlled by moral conscience alone, it
requires the institution of ‘political organs of control’ vis-à-vis the rulers.
Yet, although the traditional liberal means to that end, such as parliament,
division of powers, free press, and so on, ‘have not been entirely useless’,
they ‘remain imperfect and produce new great dangers’ by threatening
that the state will be inﬁltrated by ‘the speciﬁc interests of single classes,
business groups, and parties’ and more generally that the ‘politization of
the nation’ will eventually entail propaganda and national idolatry (Frei-
burger Kreis, 1979, pp. 66–67). Again, state authority, therefore, must be
‘true authority, that is, it must rest on trust instead of dumb and blind sub-
mission’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 76).
3.4. The order of the early ordoliberals
Just as in the views of Brunner and Gogarten, it is not the state as such, but
the authority needed to implement the divine orders that the early ordo-
liberals called for. In fact, they saw it as equally important to control the
powers of the state against abuse from those in a position to exploit them.
Walter Eucken was extremely critical of the ‘passionate belief in the state’
of his time across the political spectrum and held that it would have to be
replaced by ‘belief in God’ for the state to have a solid foundation and not
come to oppress individual freedom (Eucken, 1932a, pp. 86–87). The state
is ameans to curb ‘collective egoism’ in mass society. As Eucken later puts
it in his ﬁrst ‘principle of economic policy’: ‘The policy of the state should
aim at absolving economic power groups or to limit their functions…
16 T. KRARUP
Every consolidation of power groups strengthens the neo-feudal diminish-
ing of the authority of the state’ (Eucken, 2004 [1955], 334; see also von
Dietze, 1947).
The ordoliberal solution to the problem of a strong state whose powers
are not themselves abused aligns with Brunner’s insistence that the
implementation of the orders was ‘factual-technical’. For Eucken (1934,
1939) the task more speciﬁcally becomes ‘objective’ and ‘scientiﬁc’.
According to von Dietze (1947, p. 41), theology only provides insight
into the negative character of the divine orders, but the positive substance
of the orders ought to rely on the authority of the social sciences, not least
economics. Roughly put, the early ordoliberals saw the technocratic state
as the divine solution (guaranteed by objective science) to the problem of
human power and sin.
This explains the strange combination of market and state in early
ordoliberalism. They did not promote a ‘strong state’ as such, only as a
‘true authority’, that is, a protector of the divine orders. Similarly, they
did not support free markets as such, only as an objective, that is, non-
human mechanism of social order. Their rejection of laissez-faire capital-
ism was precisely motivated by (a) spurning belief in a substantial (rather
than negative) divine social order that will support itself independently of
human ‘assignments’ and (b) eliminating the processes not only of prole-
tarisation and brutalisation, but also of man’s self-deiﬁcation, an outcome
that the classical liberal belief in an ontological harmony and ignorance of
divine ‘assignments’ had historically entailed.
Müller-Armack, who was the ﬁrst to coin the term ‘social market
economy’ in 1946 (Manow, 2010), expanded the Memorandum’s analysis
of the process of ‘secularisation’ through which man had ‘deiﬁed’ himself
during ‘the century without God’, culminating in laissez-faire Capitalism,
Communism, Nazism and WWII. Müller-Armack called for a ‘re-Chris-
tianization’ of Western culture as ‘the only realistic possibility to
counter its inner decay in the ﬁnal last hour’ (Müller-Armack, 1968b
[1948], 486). For Rüstow (2001 [1945]), too, also writing in the wake of
the war and echoing Müller-Armack’s (1968a, p. 499) claim that ‘the
worldly belief in harmony of secularised liberalism [is] incompatible
with the acceptance of a true transcendence’, attacked the ‘deist’ ‘belief
in harmony’ of the classical liberals, according to which God’s orders
were self-fulﬁlling ‘if only man kept his ﬁnger away’ (Rüstow, 1955,
p. 60). Echoing the language of political ethics and the Memorandum,
‘man has his assignments [Aufgaben] in this world, sometimes very hard
assignments’, according to Rüstow (1955, p. 60). The rejection of a deist
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belief in God-given order is particularly worth noting as some scholars
have attributed precisely that view to early ordoliberalism in a secularised
form (Hien, 2017a, p. 269; Streeck, 2015, pp. 363–364).
3.5. Competition order
Eucken argues that ‘competition order’ is ‘the only type of order that
bends the powers of egoism’ by ‘forcing even the pure egoists to work
for the common interest’ without leading to the abuse of state power
(see also Böhm, 1937, pp. 19–21; Eucken, 2004, p. 365). In competition
order, a strict legal order, notably a strong constitution, ensures that the
state can guarantee market competition without exposing itself to the
dangers of power concentration of laissez faire because it remains as de-
politicised as possible. A strong, de-politicised and technocratic state
and a competitive market complement each other to counter power con-
centration. The market exposes every individual, ﬁrm or group to constant
competitive pressure, maintained by the state, which, in turn, is governed
by a strong constitutional order so as to avoid the arbitrariness of group
interests. In this way, egoism is not simply blocked – it is organised so
as to serve the common good, and it is the assignment of economic
policy to control and coordinate individual interests (Eucken, 2004,
p. 360). Rüstow (1955, p. 58) calls this ‘the stroke of genius of the
market economy’. As Manow (2010, pp. 10–11) puts it: ‘For the ordolib-
erals, the price mechanism is not primarily a means to the eﬃcient allo-
cation of factors, but an instrument of discipline.’
Just as in Lutheran Evangelical political ethics, the root cause of all evil
is not in any particular action, but in egoistic intentionality. According to
Böhm, orders ‘in themselves’ are innocent – but they are ‘vulnerable to the
evil intentions of people through the abuse of the orders’ (Manow, 2008,
p. 125). The problem with all other economic orders than competition is
that they cannot control the powers of egoism and will therefore even-
tually have to turn to the use of force and ‘eventually to the reign of
terror… ending with the concentration camp or the infamous bullet in
the back of the head’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 58). Indeed, evil breeds evil, and
when one seeks to resist the evildoer one will end up doing evil too.
The Memorandum explains that it is not so much the acting in one’s
self-interest in a competitive market that is evil, but ‘the demon of
Greed’; ‘not the enjoyment [Genuß] of worldly goods as such, but the
love of pleasure [Genußsucht], the egoism of enjoyment – in one word:
the materialist attitude’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 91). Similarly, it is
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not exploitation and the defeating of competitors in the market in itself
that is evil, but the ‘egoistic exploitation of one’s neighbour’ and the ‘reck-
less defeating of competitors’ that economic order must curb (Freiburger
Kreis, 1979, p. 91, my italics). In other words, egoism is only evil in so far
as it is spiritual egoism.
By 1955, Rüstow characterises his younger self of the 1920s as an ‘eager
socialist’ because of his Christian conception of ‘solidarity’ at the time
(shared by many Catholics) as largely incommensurable with market
economy: when human beings compete with each other in economic
life, they are not solidary (Rüstow, 1955, p. 54). While in 1955 he con-
tinues to believe that solidarity is ‘the necessary relationship between
human beings – conform with both duty and human nature’, he has
come to a diﬀerent conception of it through ‘diﬃcult inner struggles’
(Rüstow, 1955, p. 54). ‘[T]he fair competition of performance [Leistungs-
konkurrenz]’, through ‘the wonderful automatism in the market
economy’, in fact serves one’s neighbour by letting the person who ‘pro-
duces best and cheapest’ prevail, which is precisely ‘in the interest of the
consumer and the community’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 57). The pursuit of
self-preservation and even prosperity in the market economy is thus not
‘egoism in the negative, censuring sense of a sinful self-drive’ (Rüstow,
1955, p. 57). Rüstow continues: ‘Signiﬁcantly, the Gospel says: “love
your neighbour as yourself…” That one must love and take care of
oneself is obviously presupposed. Only, one should not treat one’s neigh-
bour… any worse than one treats oneself’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 58). As
Brunner had it: ‘Even a capitalist can be an anti-capitalist “in the heart”’
(Brunner, 1978, p. 408).
4. The diﬀerence between Calvinist-Lutheran neoliberalism and
Calvinist-Lutheran ordoliberalism
The present state of scholarly discussion over the religious roots of early
ordoliberalism is caught up with questions of Lutheranism versus Calvin-
ism that have their origin inWeber’s somewhat schematic accounts in The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. It is important to move away
from these and see that both ordoliberalism and Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire
liberalism are rooted in both Calvinism and Lutheranism, but in diﬀerent
ways.
Weber argues that the Calvinist sects of the Reformation were the germ
for the secularised spirit of rational-calculating striving for proﬁt and a
ceaseless concern with accumulation that took hold in Northern Europe
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in the nineteenth century. The ‘vocational duty’ of Protestantism, accord-
ing toWeber (1965, p. 60), was placed above the person and paved the way
for a secularised work ethic. In sharp opposition to the Catholic monastic
ideals of withdrawal from the world and charity, vocation was seen as
equivalent to Christian love by the Protestants (Weber, 1965, p. 68).
Weber claims that Luther remained a ‘traditionalist’ and that the
concept of predestination ‘took no central position with him’ – only
with the Calvinist sects, who hence constitute the ‘ideal type’ of the move-
ment (Weber, 1965, p. 120). From this concept, according to Weber,
sprang the idea of being of use to one’s neighbour, and through this the
secularised current of utilitarianism (Weber, 1965, pp. 126–127).
The Calvinist sects may well have thought of Luther as a lukewarm tra-
ditionalist, but he certainly did not appear like this to the leading theolo-
gians of Lutheran Evangelical political ethics. In direct opposition to
Weber, Gogarten explicitly rejects the sectarian movements of the Refor-
mation as the origins of modern-day individualism and humanism and
contrasts these to his own return to Luther and Calvin themselves (Gogar-
ten, 1932, p. 120; see also Althaus, 1923, p. 15). We have seen how Calvin
and Luther agreed on the importance and meaning of Romans. Moreover,
it is simply erroneous to think that Calvin (1911, p. 471) diﬀered from
Luther in his views about predestination. According to Luther, it is ‘the
eternal providence of God’ that decides ‘who are to believe or not, [and
who] are released from sin or not, so that it is entirely out of our hands
and alone in God’s hand whether we shall be pious or not’ (Luther,
1931 [1522], p. 22). But contrary to the Calvinist sects, the Lutheran Evan-
gelicals were to read this not so much in terms of an orthodoxy about a
predetermined future, but rather in light of the Pauline tenets that man
does not know justice, is incapable of doing good and can ingratiate
himself by no act whatsoever. On this anti-humanist and anti-individual-
ist basis, they forcefully rejected the utilitarianism and the concomitant
humanist ethics based on absolute individual rights that were expounded
by the Anglo-Saxon laissez faire liberals.
The order theologians and early ordoliberals knewWeber and his secu-
larisation thesis very well (Brunner, 1978, p. 439; Eucken, 1934, p. 20,
2004, p. 73; Müller-Armack, 1968a, p. x). But where Weber was inﬂuenced
by ‘liberal’ Protestantism (Carroll, 2009) and died in 1920, they adhered to
the competing tradition of Lutheran Evangelicalism and spoke against the
backdrop of Barth’s theological revolt, as well as the worldwide economic
and political crisis of the 1930s. Therefore, where Weber sees a unique
process of social and historical progress, the Lutheran Evangelicals
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perceived a dystopic process of man’s ‘self-deiﬁcation’. According to their
secularisation thesis it was precisely because the notion of vocation had
been garbled and turned into a purely economic concept, losing its Chris-
tian foundation, that the world was experiencing generalised crisis
(Brunner, 1978; Eucken, 1932b; Freiburger Kreis, 1979; Müller-Armack,
1948; Rüstow, 2001).
Yes, the price mechanism disciplines man and even bears a promise of
prosperity, but to the ordoliberals this does not mean that the bottom rock
of the argument in its favour is individual rights and individual or social
utility. Yes, private property and even democracy are to be defended, but
not because they are just. The ‘unconditional, axiomatic belief in democ-
racy’ and the ‘rationalist egalitarianism’ would have ‘fatal consequences’
on economic life (Brunner, 1978, p. 399). Eucken’s (1934, 1939, 2004)
extensive arguments in favour of ‘competition order’ is not that it is
eﬃcient or just, but that it is the only order form that has historically
and theoretically proven itself capable of directing human egoism
towards the common good and avoiding power abuse by interest
groups through the state apparatus.
As already mentioned, Luther held very diﬀerent views than the ordo-
liberals on what we would today characterise as questions of economic
doctrine, but the underlying concern of the ordoliberals is essentially
that of Luther in his writing on merchants. Merchants, Luther (1966a
[1524], pp. 294–295) says, have ‘opened all the doors and windows of
Hell’ by thinking it their just right to take whatever price it is possible
to obtain in the market for their goods, yet it is not theologically possible
to formulate a law about prices against which merchants can be held
accountable. It would perhaps be best, then, according to Luther, to
have ‘worldly authority’ hire ‘reasonable and honest people’ to establish
the value of all commodities (Luther, 1966a, p. 296). However, ‘we
Germans are so concerned with drinking and dancing that we are not
capable of upholding such regulations and order’, and so in the end we
should opt for the second-best advice: ‘To let the commodity go at the
price that it gives and takes in the common market… [and] let the
proverb prevail: “Do as other people and you will not commit follies”’
(Luther, 1966a, p. 296).
As Manow (2001, p. 193) argues, the market logic of ordoliberalism
does not spring from individualism and utilitarianism, but from Protes-
tant moralism and state philosophy. As a consequence, the ordoliberals
did not support the traditional liberal night-watchman state, but instead
a strong and neutral state capable of ‘targeted intervention’ (Eucken’s
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term), serving as a ‘market police’ upholding competition – a ‘third way’
and an alternative to both Communism and capitalism (Rüstow, 1955,
pp. 62–63).
5. Conclusion: The formation and structure of early
ordoliberalism
The formation and structure of early ordoliberalism was rooted in the
interwar Germanophone Lutheran Evangelical tradition of statism, anti-
humanism and political ethics. It was fundamentally concerned with the
problem that, following Barth, positive ‘Christian ethics’ had been
rejected, while the ‘assignment’ of love to curb human evil remained.
The genealogy of the concept of order from Luther’s meaning (worldly
authority) over that of Brunner and Gogarten (true authority, divine
order) to that of the early ordoliberals (competition order) reveals a
history not only of normative and ideational overlaps, but more impor-
tantly of a continuity of concerns, concepts and problems across
diﬀerent and sometimes opposing positions within Lutheran political
thought.
To the early ordoliberals, ‘competition order’ is not a just organisation
of human society, but rather the only order that science conﬁrms can exer-
cise authority without power abuse. This was a problem already addressed
by renowned contemporary Lutheran Evangelical theologians, of whom
the early ordoliberals were well aware, particularly within the tradition
of ‘political ethics’. While egoism is the root of all evil, the market is
not more signiﬁcantly a seedbed for egoism than any other order,
because egoism is not an act, but a spiritual state. In fact, competition
can curb the eﬀects of egoism by anonymously and automatically oppos-
ing and counterbalancing individuals against each other. When compe-
tition is guarded by an equally neutral and objective, namely a de-
politicised state, it becomes possible for Christians to truly love their
neighbours and obey the divine orders in worldly servitude.
It remains to be decided whether the Lutheran Evangelical roots of early
ordoliberalism still play an important role today. But even if this turns out
no longer to be the case, this article has contributed to ongoing debate
about the greater or smaller importance of ordoliberalism to Germany’s
line in the EU since 2007, mentioned in the introduction. Where this
debate is focused on whether or not politicians have followed ordoliberal
doctrines, the article suggests that it is not only normative and ideational
consensus that can deﬁne a political and economic ideology; it is also
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speciﬁc concerns, concepts and problems that may stretch across diﬀerent
political positions. It may very well be, then, that both sides in the debate
about ordoliberalism today are partially correct.
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